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F 
or over twenty years the media 
has unanimously presented 
Ethiopia as  being overwhelmed 
by famine and indescribable human 
suffering. Nevertheless the reality 
of the past few years would wipe aw~y 
this picture. In 1995/96, Ethiopia 
had  record harvests which allowed 
the  EC  to purchase 188,000 tonnes 
of cereals in the local market rather 
than importing it from Europe as 
part of its food aid to the country 
- a sign that the country will one 
day be able to ensure it 1S own food 
security without external aid. Concept, overall coordination and texts  :Philippe Serge DEGERNIER- © PSD 
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COUNTRY RAVAGED BY 17 YEARS 
OF TOTAL NEGLECT 
I 
Situated in the Horn of Africa, and 
cut through the middle by the great 
African Rift Valley, Ethiopia covers 
an area of just over one million 
square kilometres, with borders with 
Sudan to the west, Kenya to 
the south, Djibouti to the north-east 
and Eritrea to the north. 
With the exception of the Ogaden 
plains (in the east) which are suited 
to nomadic animal husbandry, 
Ethiopia is primarily a mountainous 
country whose agricultural 
production varies with altitude. 
Below 1 ,800 metres, cotton, tobacco 
and maize are grown, the richest 
areas are between 1 ,800 and 2,500 
where production of cereals, fruit, 
vegetables and coffee (the principal 
cash crop) is possible. Above 2,500 
metres, the climatic conditions allow 
only barley and animal rearing. 
D 
espite  having the  necessary  conditions 
for food  security  (vast tracts of arable  land, 
a climate which is  generally favourable to agricul-
ture), a entire generation of the  Ethiopian popula-
tion fell  victim to terrible famine  due  more to 
the  poI iti  cal  choices  of the au tho riti  es  than to 
climatic conditions. In 1974 a military coup d'Etat 
overthrew  Haille  Selasie's  imperial  regime,  which 
foundered  in the midst of a famine which  claimed 
at least 200,000  lives.  Power was  monopolised 
by  a committee - the  Derg - of military person-
nel  which established an  authoritarian State based 
on  socialist  lines.  In  1977  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Haile Miriam  Mengistu emerged to take control of 
the  Derg  and tortured or eliminated his opponents. 
With  Russian  and  Cuban  support  Mengistu 
imposed  a  totalitarian military regime  to  put an 
end to the various rebellions in the country, partic-
ularly in  Eritrea, and to embark on  a war against 
Somalia in 1977/78. 
Victim of the drought in  1984. 
In 1984/85 a famine  of unprecedented  scale  took 
hold of the country, especially in the north, causing 
the  death  of hundreds of thousands  of people. 
Drought was  officially declared to  be  the  cause 
of the  crisis,  but in  fact a  decade  of policies  pur-
sued  by  the  authorities was  the primary cause. 
These  policies brought about a fall  in  agricultural 
production  because  it  was  based  on  meeting 
the  needs  of urban  consumers  to the  detriment of 
the  small  producers.  Moreover,  in  the  north of 
the country ravaged by the  Eritrean's war of libera-
tion,  the  policies of repression  greatly enfeebled 
the  local  peasants  who  found  their cereal  stocks 
and  their herds  destroyed  or commandeered  by 
the military. As a result the peasants no  longer had 
the  necessary  resources  to  survive the  drought 
when it struck in 1983/4. Nr3-JAN'97  FOOD  FOR  DEVELOPMENT  FOOD  SECURITY  IN  ETHIOPIA 
FACTS AND FIGURES 
-.  Land area: 1,098,000 square kilometres. 
-.  Population : 58 million inhabitants. 
-.  Capital : Addis Abeba. 
-.  National currency : Birr. 
-.  Annual inflation : 3  %. 
-. Languages:  English, Amharic, Oromo, 
Tigrenya, Somali, Afar, etc. 
-.  Per capita GNP : US$ 130. 
-.  Population growth rate : 3. 1 % per year. 
-. Urbanised population: 16 %. 
Throughout 1984 the  government suppressed  all 
information concerning the gravity of the situation. 
It was  not unti I the  end  of 1984 that the first pic-
tures were beamed around the planet and the inter-
national  community set  in  train  the  distribution 
of approximately 1.200.000 tonnes  of food  aid 
throughout  1995. At this time,  the  government 
put  in  place  a  new  policy to  increase  agricultural 
production and  combat drought (and also to under-
mine the  basis  of rebellion  in  the  regions  con-
cerned)  by  the  transfer of 600,000 peasants  from 
the  relatively unproductive north to fertile lands  in 
the  south.  This  policy of forced  relocation  used  the 
leverage  of food  aid  to  oblige  famished  peasants 
to  leave  their  land  and  report to  distribution 
centres which  also  served  as  transit centres. 
These  population  movements  took  place  in 
deplorable  conditions  (forced  relocation,  separa-
tion  of families,  lack  of basic  facilities  in  the 
camps,  etc.)  with  very  poor  results,  since  the  dis-
placed  peasants  did not have  any experience of the 
new  land  which  although  described  as  fertile was 
often  marshy  or  unhealthy.  Unaccustomed  to 
the  climatic  conditions,  these  peasants  died  from 
hunger or  malaria,  and  suffered  from the  absence 
of arrangements for their arrival  as  well  as 
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the  hostility of the  existing  inhabitants.  The  main 
consequences  of this operation were  the destabilis-
ing  of agricultural  production  in  the  north and  the 
further  impoverishment of the  displaced  popula-
tions. 
Another  government policy further destroyed 
the  Ethiopian  agricultural system- villagisation. 
Starting  in  1985, the  objective was  to  regroup 
the  peasants  from  the  rich  central  agricultural 
regions,  who  lived  in  dispersed  habitations,  and 
created  new  sites  which  according  to  the  govern-
ment were  more  suitable to  their economic  and 
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Unloading  EC emergency aid in  the region of Mekel/e. 
social  development.  This  measure  profoundly and 
permanently undermined  Ethiopian  society. 
Combined  with the  policy of  relocation  and  with 
drought,  it resulted  in  another foreseeable  famine 
in1987. 
These  policies  linked with the  struggle against 
the  rebellion- 46 %  of the  Ethiopian  State bud-
get went on  the war effort- pushed the essentially 
agriculture-based  economy  into  chaos.  The  aban-
donment of the  regime  by  its  Russian  supporters 
precipitated  it's fall.  Although  equipped with 
a  powerful  army,  the  Derg  did  not hold  out  long 
against the  aggression  of the  combined  Tigray, 
Eritrea and  Oromo  resistance  armies.  In 1990 
the  Eritrean  Liberation  Front captured  the  port 
of  Masawa  and  cut the  Ethiopian  army's supply 
lines, whilst the Tigrean  Liberation Front advanced 
towards Addis Ababa.  In May 1991 Mengistu fled 
the  country and  the  rebel  forces  seized  Addis 
Ababa.  In July of the  same  year a national  confer-
ence  uniting the principal political organisations of 
the  country named  Meles  Zenawi  President at the 
head  of a transitional government.  This  brought to 
and  end  17  years  of a  dictatorial  regime  which, 
through its misguided policies, brought agricultural 
production and the entire economy to its knees. Nr3-JAN ' 97  FOOD  FOR  DEVELOPMENT  FOOD  SECURITY  IN  ETHIOPIA 
ONE OF THE POOREST 
REGIONS IN THE WORL. 
Ethiopia  is  one of the poorest countries  in 
the world. The  Human  Development 
Index produced by the  United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) puts 
Ethiopia at 161st place,  out of 173 
countries.  Under the old  regime,  the 
Ethiopian economy's growth rate was one 
of the lowest of all developing countries. 
The per capita GNP stagnated between 
$100 and $125 and today even when 
compared with other developing countries 
in the sub-continent Ethiopia is still  one 
of the poorest. The central  planning 
policies of the old regime left the 
economy dramatically under-capitalised, 
uncompetitive, undiversified,  and without 
markets. At the dictatorship's end,  the 
economy was operating at only 10% 
capacity. 
D 
espite  its  collapse  during the  1980s, agricul-
ture  is  still  the  pillar of the  Ethiopian 
economy.  This sector accounts for 90  %  of 
the  population.  Despite  significant  investment 
in  State farms carried out by  the  old  regime,  cere-
als - the staple food  for the majority of the popu-
lation - are  mostly produced  by  relatively  poor 
small  producers,  who  are  isolated  and  who  work 
the  land without any  inputs.  Unfortunately 
the  small  producers were  ignored  by  the  former 
regime  for a  long  time and  suffered  from  policies 
protecting  the  interests of consumers,  (with  an 
artificially low price),  from the  lack  of investment 
in  roads and  transport, and  from the  lack of devel-
opment of cereal  markets. 
Coffee harvesting. Coffee remains one 
of the main cash crop  in  Ethiopia 
Even  in  the area of external  trade the country still 
specialises  in  agricultural  products,  with  50  % 
of exports  made  up  of coffee,  15 %  leather,  and 
7  %  other agricultural  products such  as  peanut 
seed,  sugar,  and vegetables.  In contrast, the manu-
facturing  sector  remains  under-developed  and 
largely dominated  by  public  companies.  A  lack 
of raw materials and  foreign  currency,  obsolete 
machinery and  a  problematic  energy  supply  are 
amongst the primary difficulties in this sector. FOO D  SECURIT Y  IN  ET HIOPIA  FOOD  FOR  DEVELOPMENT  Nr3-JAN ' 97 
Since the  establishment of the  new 
regime,  reforms have  been  introduced 
to  liberalise the  economy  and  make 
it more  competitive,  in  an  effort 
to  increase  growth.  To  this end  the 
Ethiopian  Birr was  devalued  by 
approximately 50 %  in  October 1992, 
and  a  flexible  exchange  rate  policy 
was  adopted  in  1993. Today  macro 
economics are  characterised  by  a  real 
deregulation  and  foreign  trade  has 
improved.  New  codes  governing 
investment,  work and  public  compa-
nies were  enacted  in  1992. The  trans-
port sector  has  also  been  liberalised 
and  subsidies  for agricultural  inputs 
have  been  progressively  reduced. 
Moreover,  as  part of the  process 
of tax reforms, the 30 %tax on  commercial impor-
tation  of cereals was  brought down  to  5  % 
in  January 1996. This  reform  should  substantially 
increase  commercial  imports,  previously  discour-
aged, and  so  reduce  importation of food aid. 
Because  of the  nature  of the  old  regime,  Ethiopia 
for a long time received the smallest level  of exter-
nal  aid  per  capita  of Sub-Saharan  Africa.  From 
the  beginning  of 1991, following  the  transition 
of power,  and  in  order to  make  up  for  lost time, 
11 donors  launched  a  reconstruction  programme 
<Emergency  Recovery  and  Reconstruction 
Programme- ERRP).  This  initiative was  followed 
by  an  agreement between  the  Ethiopian  govern-
ment and the Bretton Woods' institutions on  a pro-
gramme for  economic  reforms.  As  a  consequence 
the  IMF released  a structural  adjustment facility. 
In this context, the  EC  gave  its agreement in  1993 
for a structural adjustment facility of ECU  75 mil-
ion  as  a budgetary support for social  expenditures. 
The  objective  of this allocation was  to  mitigate 
the  burden  of the  economic  reforms.  In  1993 
Ethiopia's donors  meeting  in  the  form of the  Paris 
Club  granted  a  significant easing  of the  country's 
debt.  Unfortunately these  reforms  are  not enough 
in  the short term to end  the  country's food security 
problems. The major aspects 
of  food insecurity 
.  -
in Ethiopia 
"-./ 
The majority of the Ethiopian population spends 
between 60 % and 70 % of the household budget 
on food. In urban and semi-urban areas, 
this proportion can rise to 80 %. Moreover, 
for the poorest of the poor, supplies of firewood 
represent a further 14 % of the family budget. 
This situation reveals the great vulnerability 
of the population to price rises and/  or reductions 
in income. In these scenarios, being poor means 
being unable to cover the most basic physical 
necessities of life. At the moment 26 million people, 
almost half of the population of Ethiopia, 
are living in extreme poverty. 
,......;; 
~ 
Each year 4 million individuals need to be assisted because they are unable to feed 
themselves. In times of drought, this figure rises to over 7 million. 75 % of people 
in a precarious food situation are classified as rural poor. The remaining 25 % are 
from urban populations. There is malnutrition in the population, even in years when 
the country is not struck by drought. 
The country's structural cereals deficit (the balance between national consumption 
and the availability of food after importation) is in the region of approximately one 
million tonnes. During a year of normal production, even with an individual energy 
intake the equivalent of 80% of the minimum level to lead a healthy and active life, 
the country's cereals deficit is estimated at 15 % of production. This deficit rises 
to 50% (3 million tonnes) if one allows for a rise in calorific intake to the full 100 % 
of the minimum level (2,100 calories per person per day). 
The country's chronic food insecurity is due to three factors which are distinct 
but nevertheless linked. First of all there is insufficient production/supply, with 
the development of supply being hampered by unsuitable agricultural production 
techniques, a high number of smallholdings which only allow traditional agriculture, 
environmental degradation, irregular rainfall, lack of inputs and credit, 
pre and post-harvest losses as well as undeveloped trading structures. 
On the demand side, the weak purchasing power created by the endemic poverty 
of the population is preventing the development of market conditions which could 
encourage an increase in production. Finally historical factors (with the economy 
having experienced years of negligence and war) plays on these first two factors 
since the country has to overcome several years of war, famines and neglect 
of food security. It goes without saying that the constant rise in population, which 
is greater than the rise in agricultural production, can only exacerbate this over-
whelming state 
of affairs through the effect on the environment 
and the degradation of soils caused by the extension 
of cultivated areas, and the destruction of forest 
caused by the collection of firewood. 10 
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TJDl EC'S FOOD 
.AND FOOD G'l:'llft'l'11"11 
Measures ~  by the EC to 
Ethiopia  1 s food deficit and food 
problems are'~  -'llfar ueJmonsl;ra·GlOJ 
the EC Is new p?liorities for  v•v.~u.<:oa" 
aid - to inteSale food a,J.d as 
instrument ~U  port Of a  ~~nHn+-t~ 
of food security. On its own, a 
annual allocation of food'laid cannot be 
a long term solution to significantly 
improve the food security of the Ethiopian 
population. Ethiopia has land which 
iB productive enough to improve its 
agricultural production with appropriate 
techniques. With this in mind, since 1994 
the EC has d~veloped a two-pronged 
approach consisting of, in the medium 
term, the allocation of food aid to absorb 
part of the chronic deficit, and in the long 
term activities in support of. a national 
food  ~ 
the  follolllriru~t ~m~tr: 
-An unprecedented campaign of local 
purchase to support the market 
and encourage production ; 
-Food aid made available to NGOs 
(non governmental organisations) and 
the WFP (United Nations World Food 
Programme) to set up projects with a food 
component (to combat the food deficit) ; 
-Through the use of counterpart funds, 
targeted budgetary support as part of 
the process of structural aclJustment ; 
-The financing of store construction as 
part of a programme to address the 
deficiencies in thiS area ; 
-The financing of a study on 
the development of a  long term strategy 
for food security; 
-The financing of government food security 
activities. 
THE  EX'1'D1'l' 
OF COMMUNITY 
FOOD AID 
In 1994 and 1995, Ethiopia was 
the largest recipient of Community 
food aid with a total of ECU 74.5 
million in 1994 and ECU 75.6 m1llion 
- more than 300,000 tonnes -
in 1995 (this aid amounts to approxi-
mately 15 % of the total food aid 
budget in each year). Moreover, 
for the first time 188,000 tonnes 
was purchased in an unprecedented 
programme of local purchase. Nr3-JAN ' 97  FOOD  FOR  DEVELOPMENT  FOOD  SECURITY  IN  ETHIOPIA 
THE EC'S MEDIUM TERM RESPONSE : 
THE MARKET SALE OF FOOD AI · 
Unloading EC food aid bought locally. 
I 
n  1994 and  1995 the  EC  allocated  food  aid 
(called  direct aid  because  it is  placed  directly 
without passing through another agency to the gov-
ernment of the  country  concerned)  in  the  form 
of cereals  to  partially cover  the  country's chronic 
food  deficit In accordance with  its policy,  the  EC 
does  not hand  out its food aid freely in  the  country, 
but sells  it so  as  not to  upset the  market and  pre-
cipitate a  fall  in  the  price  to  producers  and 
so  reduce  the  income  of small  producers.  The  pro-
ceeds  from the  sale  of this aid  allocated  to  the 
Ethiopian government constitute counterpart funds 
that are  used  to  provide  targeted  budgetary assis-
tance  as  part of the  national  structural adjustment 
programme.  The  aid  is  therefore  structural  and 
integrated  into a wider policy of food  security and 
the economic rehabilitation of the country. 
In  1994,  13,00  0  tonnes  of wheat (with a  total 
value  of ECU  26.5 million, freight costs  included) 
was  al located  to  Ethiopia by  the  EC.  An  initial 
tranche  of this aid  (50,000 tonnes)  was  provided 
to  partially  cover  the  food  deficit in  Addis  Ababa 
in  June. It is  at this period that the  price of wheat 
fluctuates widely  and  impacts  on  the  price 
of bread. This aid therefore contributed to a stabil-
isation of prices,  enabling poor urban consumers to 
buy  bread.  A  parastatal  organisation  (Ethiopian 
ll -
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Grain  Trade  Enterprise)  effected 
the  sale  of the  wheat to  the  mills 
who,  in  their  turn,  sold  the  wheat 
to  the  bakers  owned  by  the  city 
administration (under the  kebele  sys-
tem).  The  second  tranche,  80,000 
tonnes  of wheat,  was  provided to the 
Emergency  Strategic  Food  Reserve 
in  response  to  the first signs  of 
a famine. 
In  1995, the  EC  set  aside  a  total 
sum  of  ECU  75.6 million to  finance 
food  aid  amounting  to  a  total 
of 292,304 tones  as  will  as  ECU 
10  million to  buy  various  products. 
Of  this  total,  the  EC  provided 
150,000 tonnes  in  direct aid, 96,304 
tonnes  via  NGOs  and  46,000 tonnes 
through  WFP.  The  150,000 tonnes 
of direct aid  came  in  two  equal  tranches  of 
75,000 tonnes.  One  of these,  as  in  1994, was  sold 
in  the  markets to  increase the  availability of bread 
to  disadvantaged  urban  groups.  This  action  also 
helped  the  country's balance of payments by  avoid-
ing  additional  imports  of food.  The  other tranche 
went to  restock  the  Emergency  Food  Strategic 
Reserve. 
In 1996 no  direct aid was  allocated 
in the light of a record 21 % rise  in agri-
cultural  production.  The  main  cereals 
harvest went from 9.7 million tonnes 
in  1995 to 11.7 million tonnes  in  1996. 
The  provision  of the  second  tranche 
of 75,000  tonnes  for the  national 
reserve  was  carried out during  1996 by 
local  cereals  purchase.  So  as  not 
to  swell  the  markets with food  aid,  only 
one  indirect allocation of 88,000 tonnes 
of cereals  via  WFP  and  NGOs  was 
planned over and  above financial  alloca-
tions to support other activities support-
ing food security. Nr3-JAN'97  FOOD  FOR  DEVELOPMENT  FOOD  SECURITY  IN  ETHIOPIA 
THE EMERGENCY 
FOOD STRATEGIC RESER 
For over twenty years in Ethiopia there 
has been  a clear need for a food security 
reserve to deal with the chronic deficit 
in "effective demand" - that is to say 
the people's inability to obtain the food 
necessary to their survival, given their 
pronounced poverty (and therefore 
the weakness of their purchasing power). 
Following a study on the country's food 
security problems carried out by the 
United Nations in 1974 the Emergency 
Food Strategic Reserve (EFSR) was 
created in 1982, the principal objective 
being to ensure rapid provision of food 
supplies in case of sudden scarcity. 
U 
nder the  old  regime  the  EFSR  never  func-
tioned properly because,  although the admin-
istrative procedures for releases  of stock (including 
donor participation) were  clearly and  formally 
agreed,  they were  never applied to the  satisfaction 
of the donors. Therefore, the  E  FS R was  never able 
to achieve  its objective of bringing real aid to those 
in  need  due  to the  lack of transparency in  its man-
agement and  the  former  regimes  manipulation 
of the system  in  support of policies which were out-
side  of its intended  purpose  (for example the  relo-
cation policy). 
In October  1992 the  E  FS R came  under  indepen-
dent administrative management and  began 
to  build a  reputation  for efficient and  viable  man-
agement which  earned  the  confidence  of the donor 
community.  In that year the  E FS R's  capacity 
was  set  to  rise  to  205,000  tonnes  in  the  short 
term,  307,000  tonnes  in  the  medium  term. 
The  basis for arriving at the medium term objective 
EFSR 's  warehouse. 
was a calculation of the quantity of food  necessary 
to  feed  the  vu lnerable  Ethiopian  population 
for  four  months  on  400  grams  per  person 
and per day.  Four months was the minimum period 
before  the  government could  receive  aid  from the 
donors  in  a  time  of crisis.  The  EFSR  with the 
assistance of the donors (including the  EC)  and  the 
Ethiopian  government embarked  on  a  vast  pro-
gramme of storage  site  construction which,  at the 
end  of  1995 took the storage capacity to  216,000 
tonnes (capacity was only 36,490 tonnes in  1992). 
The locations  of  stores  were  chosen  according  to 
precise and  rational criteria : to be  close to regions 
repeatedly affected  by  drought, to  be  accessible to 
heavy goods veh icles,  to give a reduction  in  admin-
istrative and  operational costs  and  to allow for the 
planning of recycling  or rotation  of stocks.  To  this 
effect,  stores  were  concentrated  in  five  places  : 
Mekelle,  l<ombolcha,  Nazareth,  Shasheme, 
and Dire Dawa. 
13 I  14 
In  its  1994 programme the  EC  allocated  80,000 
tonnes  of food  aid  to  the  E FS R  in  response  to 
the beginnings of a famine caused  by  a substantial 
drop  in  the  harvest against earlier predictions, 
especially in  the  north of the country. At the  same 
time a  re-evaluation  of vulnerable people  (drought 
victims,  the  displaced  and  returnees,  victims  of 
war,  etc.)  was  carried  out in  the  country which 
showed  that their number had  risen  by  25  %  to 
reach  over  6  million  potential  beneficiaries.  This 
allocation enabled the  EFSR to reinforce its capac-
ity to  intervene  in  the  face  of this  increase  in  the 
number of people  unable  to  guarantee their food 
needs. 
These  80,000  tonnes  were  delivered  in 
October/November 1994. From the point of view of 
mobilisation, this operation was  novel  in  so  far as 
it was  the first time  Community  food  aid  to 
Ethiopia had  been  delivered to  its final destination 
(instead  of  to  the  port of entry).  Cargoes  were 
delivered  to  four  different places  by journeys 
R  DEVELOPMENT 
Stocking  local purchases 
carried out by the EC. 
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of sometimes  up  to  1,000  kilometres  by  road. 
Despite  the  long  journeys  and  working  conditions 
which  were  often  difficult, these  transport opera-
tions  suffered  only  small  losses.  The  implementa-
tion of the operation was  an  undoubted success and 
led  to  close  working relations between  the  EC  and 
the  EFSR.  The  EC  has  even  become  a  member 
of the executive technical committee. 
Given the success  of the operation in  1994, the  EC 
allocated  75,000 tonnes  of food  to  EFSR  in  1995 
to  cover  shortages  as  necessary  during  the  1996 
pre-harvest  gap.  This  assistance  increased 
the  capacity  of the  E  FS R to  respond  to  shortages 
and  was used  in  the form of loans to aid and  reha-
bilitation agencies  as  they waited for the  mobilisa-
tion  of other sources  of help.  It is  envisaged  that 
the  beneficiaries of this aid will  receive  food 
rations in  return for developmental work according 
to  the  disaster management policy,  under which 
beneficiaries should  participate  in  job  creation 
schemes. A large local purchasing 
campaign 
At the end of 1995 the Ethiopian harvest broke production records and resulted in 
a substantial tradable surplus. In fact the harvest was so good that there was some 
anxiety about keeping the market price above the cost of production so as to avoid 
any loss of farmers confidence in the emerging market as a place to sell their surplus. 
The consequence of such a loss of confidence could have 
been a reduction in the areas cultivated the following 
season and therefore a drop in production. 
In this light, and given the commitment of the EC 
to support the Ethiopian government in a policy of long 
term food security, the Commission decided to support 
production by a massive campaign of local purchases 
under direct and indirect programmes. This approach 
had the clear advantages of avoiding flooding 
the emerging market with large quantities of imported 
cereals and was also a lot cheaper. The operation covers 
a total of 188,000 tonnes of cereals of which 
75,000 going to the Strategic Reserve (direct aid) 
and 113,000 tonnes going to WFP and NGOs  (indirect 
aid). It supports the price to producers and therefore 
avoids a drop in production. 
This operation is the largest and most complex local purchase ever undertaken 
by the Commission. The management of these purchases was carried out in the field 
by a team of technical assistants specially assigned to the Community food aid 
programme. To make up 75,000 tonnes for the reserve 25 contracts (each for 
approximately 3,000 tonnes) were awarded and the deliveries of cereals to five 
different stores began in May 1996, lasting nine months. This division into lots of 
3,000 tonnes was fixed on as being better adapted to the conditions of the Ethiopian 
cereals market. 
The supervision of this operation necessitated an enormous investment of time 
from the team of technical assistants on the ground who had to ensure the quality 
(variable) of the food delivered (inspection, cleaning, fumigation). Nevertheless, 
the programme was greatly appreciated by all parties involved (private sector, State, 
and international). Moreover, thanks to the level of co-operation which exists 
between donors, most food 
aid programmes ear-marked 
for the country were either 
postponed or redirected so as 
not to flood the market. 16 
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HE EC'S LONG TERM RESPONSE : 
SUPPORT TO FOOD SECURITY 
The Financing 
of a study 
on the development 
of a long term strategy 
for food security 
F 
or several  years  now it has  been  clear that 
the  solution  to the  structural  Ethiopian  food 
deficit was not the delivery of large amounts 
of food  aid  but the  design  and  implementation by 
the  Ethiopian  government of a  food  security 
strategy. In this light the  EC  commissioned a study 
('European  strategy  in  support of food  security 
in  Ethiopia'  - AD E)  of possible food  security 
strategies in  Ethiopia and  passed  it on  to the  gov-
ernment. 
This  study  highlighted the structural weaknesses 
from  Ethiopian agricultural production to effective 
demand.  Nevertheless,  the  real  rises  in  production 
(the  main  harvest in  1995 reached  9.7 million 
tonnes and 11.7 million tonnes in 1996) as well as 
the  implementation of liberal  economic policies 
made the maintenance of producer prices possible, 
which shows  that the  rise  in  production  between 
1994 and  1996 was  stimulated as  much  by  price 
incentives as by better climatic conditions. 
This  analysis  led  to the  proposal  of a three-tiered 
approach to  improve food  security in  Ethiopia 
by  addressing  three different problems :  How to 
improve agricultural production? How to improve 
access  to this produce ? (or how to  increase effec-
tive demand  ?)  How to manage  the  risks  of crisis 
and  how to  manage  crises  should  they arise ? 
To  develop a strategy in answer to these  questions, 
the  study puts forward three propositions : 
to  improve agricultural  production  you  need 
the incentive of a higher producer price, to improve 
effective demand you  need  to  develop  income  gen-
erating activities, and to respond to crises you  need 
a system of disaster management based  on  an early 
warning system  and  means  of immediate  interven-
tion, as well as an adequate rehabilitation policy. Nr3-JAN'97 
Food for work programme. 
The financing 
of  government food 
security activities 
The  record  cereal  harvest of 1995/96 clearly 
showed  that in favourable macro-economic and 
climatic conditions,  Ethiopia can  manage  its own 
food  security. It is therefore  important to  help 
the  Ethiopian  government put in  place  a  viable 
food  security po licy through action  other than 
the  simple delivery  of food.  To  this end,  as  part 
of its 1996 programme, the  EC  established finan-
cial  assistance for five activities in  support of 
the country's food security for a maximum of three 
years,  with a total  value of  ECU  12.43 million 
(over and  above  some  88,000 tonnes  of food  aid 
indirectly allocated to WFP and  NGOs). 
These activities correspond to the  European strate-
gy of capacity building in the following areas: 
-(I)  General  employment projects  :  Planning 
and  implementation of projects designed  to create 
jobs and  increase  incomes,  allowing better access 
to food  in  order to  minimise  the distribution 
of free food aid; 
-(II)  Improvements to the  early warning  system  : 
establishment of a local  level early warning system 
in  the  regions  and  improved  promotion  of 
its importance ; 
-{Ill) Combined  plan for the transport and organi-
sation of aid  :  establishment of procedures 
for organisation and  co-ordination  between  the 
parties  responsible for transport and  logistics 
of  aid  in  order to  improve efficiency  in  times 
of crisis; 
-{IV) Improvements in the agro-meteorology service : 
improvement and  strengthen ing  of services 
to improve the quality and availability of meteoro-
logical  information so  as  to  increase  agricultural 
production ; 
-(V)  Evaluation and  supervision  of erosion/sedi-
mentation  problems  :  development of projects to 
check  erosion to  increase  productivity and  overall 
agricultural production. 
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